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Abstract

With the rapid development of information technology, data availability is improved
greatly. Data may be accessed at anytime by people from any location. However,
threats to data security and privacy arise as one of the major problems of the development of information systems, especially those information systems which contain
personal information.
An association database is a personal information system which contains associations between persons. In this thesis, we identify the security and privacy problems
of association databases. In order to solve these problems, we propose a new security
and privacy model for association databases equipped with both direct access control
and inference control mechanisms. In this model, there are multiple criteria including,
not only confidentiality, but also privacy and other aspects of security to classify the
association. The methods used in the system are:
• The direct access control method is based on the mandatory model;
• The inference control method is based on both logic reasoning and probabilistic
reasoning (Belief Networks).
My contributions to security and privacy model for association databases and to inference control in the model include:
• Identification of security and privacy problems in association databases;
• Formal definition of association database model;
• Representation association databases as directed multiple graphs;

v

• Development of axioms for direct access control;
• Specification of the unauthorized inference problem;
• A method for unauthorized inference detection and control that includes:
• Development of logic inference rules and probabilistic inference rule;
• Application of belief networks as a tool for unauthorized inference detection
and control.

vi

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Jennifer Seberry and Dr. Janusz
R. Getta, without whom this work would not have been possible.
I also would like to thank Dr. Tianbing Xia, Ken Finlayson, Jun Chen, Jianbo Cen
for their kind help on me for the development of my thesis.
My thanks also go to all members of this crypto group, all staff in the department
of computer science, for the help they rendered me.
Finally I am grateful to the supports from my family, girl friend, and friends.

vii

Contents

Abstract

v

Acknowledgements

vii

1 Introduction

1

1.1

Information Technology and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.3

The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.4

Strategy of Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.5

Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2 Technical Background
2.1

7

Security of Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.1.1

Direct Access Control Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.1.2

Inference Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.2

Probabilistic Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.3

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

3 Definitions and Concepts
3.1

3.2

16

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.1.1

Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.1.2

Equivalent Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.1.3

Sensitivity Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Features of Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

viii

3.2.1

Conflicts between Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

3.2.2

The Property of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Association Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

3.3.1

Logic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

3.3.2

Conceptual Model

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

3.3.3

Graph Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.4

Assumptions and Simplifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

3.5

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

3.3

4 Solution
4.1

4.2

4.3

32

Direct Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

4.1.1

Multi-dimensional Mandatory Access Control Model . . . . . .

33

Inference Detection and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

4.2.1

Scenarios of Inference in Association Databases . . . . . . . . .

36

4.2.2

Characteristics of Inference Control in an Association Database

44

4.2.3

Logic Relations of Binary Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

4.2.4

Logic Inference Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

4.2.5

Probabilistic Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

4.2.6

Unauthorized Inference in Association Databases . . . . . . . .

58

4.2.7

Inference Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

4.2.8

Inference Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

5 Conclusion

70

6 Future Work

72

A Probabilistic Inference and Algorithms

73

A.1 Belief Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

A.2 Probabilistic Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

A.3 The Variable Elimination Algorithm

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

A.4 An Algorithm Works on Singly Connected (Polytree) Networks . . . . .

77

A.5 Inference in Multiply Connected Belief Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

ix

A.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B An Example for the Access Control in Association Databases

80
81

B.1 Database Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

B.2 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

B.2.1 Inference Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

B.2.2 Inference Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

B.2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

Bibliography

93

x

List of Tables

1.1

Sample Association Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2

Sample Association Data with Privacy/Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

3.1

Association Data with Sensitivity Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

3.2

Person A’s Assessment on Association with Person B . . . . . . . . . .

25

3.3

Person B’s Assessment on Association with Person A . . . . . . . . . .

25

4.1

Comparison between the Graph Representation and Belief Networks . .

62

xi

List of Figures

3.1

Conceptual Schema of Association Database in UML Notation . . . . .

28

3.2

Example of Graph Model for Association Database . . . . . . . . . . .

29

4.1

Sample Association Database of Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

4.2

Sample Association Database of Scenario 1 for User s . . . . . . . . . .

37

4.3

Sample Association Database of Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

4.4

Sample Association Database of Scenario 2 for User s . . . . . . . . . .

39

4.5

Sample Association Database of Scenario 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

4.6

Sample Association Database of Scenario 3 for User s . . . . . . . . . .

41

4.7

Sample Association Database of Scenario 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

4.8

Sample Association Database of Scenario 4 for User s . . . . . . . . . .

42

4.9

Sample Association Database of Scenario 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

4.10 Sample Association Database of Scenario 5 for User s . . . . . . . . . .

44

4.11 Example of Information Context of Vertex A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

4.12 Inference in Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

4.13 Inference in Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

4.14 Inference in Scenario 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

A.1 A Sample Belief Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

B.1 Sample Association Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

B.2 Higher Level Associations for User s

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

B.4 The Logic Graph G`s for s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

B.3 The Visible Graph Gs for s

xii

B.5 Topology of the Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability
of A9AE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

B.6 The Complete Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability of
A9AE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

B.7 Topology of the Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability
of A2BC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

B.8 The Complete Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability of
A2BC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

90

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Information Technology and Privacy

With the power of information technology, we benefit greatly in this digital information
age. Information technology has been applied to many aspects of our lives: business,
finance, education, government, health and so on. However the ability to automatically
manipulate data, the increased ease of possible access to vast amount of data, and their
availability regardless of time and place all create a completely different and increasingly complex environment that challenges traditional approaches to confidentiality
and security [32].
Personal information privacy, i.e. “the ability of the individual to personally control
information about oneself” [35], has become very important with the aspect of storing
and managing information in this cyber era. Significant progress has been made in
the areas of storing and managing personal information in database systems. However,
the control of security, privacy, sensitivity and confidentiality remains as a major problem in personal information systems. Good protection gives the owner of information
more confidence about the storing of the information inside the database, consequently
increases the value of the database.

1.2

Related Work

This problem of privacy and security control in this digital age has been well recognized
[4, 21, 23, 26, 38]. These works are on the preliminary stage of solving this problem,
they identified the problem and proposed possible solutions for it. In the past few years,
1
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some researchers began to investigate the problem, and develop methods to solve the
problem.
Recently, IBM researchers have worked on a new database design called a Hippocratic database that takes consumer privacy into account in the way it stores and
retrieves information [24]. The basis of the design is borrowed from a major tenet of
the Hippocratic oath governing doctor-patient relationships. The database negotiates
the privacy of information between a user and an organization. The database owner
sets an information storage and retrieval policy which database donors can accept or
deny [22]. It is now still in the design process. Agrawal et al. proposed a straw-man
design of the Hippocratic database in [3].
Prescient International has developed a tool for privacy enhancement [2]. The
Encrypted Relational Database Model is proposed as a new method that ensures privacy
and confidentiality of patient records. Actually, this model hides the relationships
between data elements, so that neither systems nor database administrators will be
able to compile pieces of confidential information on any patient. The access to the
database must come from the application layer, then through the access control security
layer and encryption key services engine.
Biskup and Brüggeman designed a privacy oriented information system based on
the personal model of data in [12]. Individuals are represented by encapsulated objects
called persons. The privacy policy is based on two kinds of rights: evaluation of
an expression is confined to acquaintances by query modification and is refused if a
person does not hold appropriate authorities on roles comprising the needed operation;
acquaintances can be granted or revoked; combined rights can be made temporarily
available to other persons.
In summary, all these research works try to solve the problems related to information
security and privacy. However none of them are mature enough to solve the problem.
There are many challenges in this area, such as:
• What criteria should be taken into account for information security and privacy
classification?
• How do information donors understand these criteria and then take rights to
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classify their information?
• From the database point of view, how do we control access so that the system fully
complies with security and privacy requirements? The access control contains two
aspects:
• direct access control;
• inference control.
Our approach focuses on direct access control and inference control issues for a
personal information system (association database) which partially addresses the challenges above.

1.3

The Problem

About 10 years ago, it was reported in the media that an Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) database stored associations (i.e. who knows whom). The
association was based on many criteria, both loose and tight, such as business, location, clubs and sports etc. The functionality of the database was in allowing people
to track that suspect A had a proven way of being associated with suspect B. No
security protection was needed in this system because ICAC had rights to know these
associations, so as to carry out its legal mandate.
If a user of an association database is not ICAC but some public user, then the protection of personal association data becomes really important. The following example
makes this case even stronger.
Example 1:
Suppose in an association database, the following associations are stored:
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Person A knows Person B
1. Both in Parliament
2. Usually dined in restaurant together
3. Lovers
Table 1.1: Sample Association Data
Obviously some associations need to be classified at different levels from others with
respect to the privacy/sensitivity of the subjects of the associations, as the following
table shows:
Person A knows person B

privacy/sensitivity

1. Both in Parliament

NO

2. Usually dined in restaurant together

NO

3. Lovers

YES

Table 1.2: Sample Association Data with Privacy/Sensitivity

From the above non-sensitive data (association data 1 and 2), we infer that Person
A and Person B had a more intimate personal relationship than generally believed and
this relationship is probably a sensitive association between them.
We assert that such a database of associations needs to have mechanisms to protect
privacy/security/sensitivity included.
Here is another example:
Example 2:
Associations which can be used to infer more sensitive association:
• Person A is person B’s private doctor;
• Person A is a heart disease expert;
• Person B has heart disease.
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The first two associations are non-sensitive data; and the third one is sensitive data.
From the first two associations, it is likely that the third one will be deduced.
Inference control aims at protecting data from indirect detection [16]. In an association database, all data inside are associations between persons. Correlations are
ubiquitous among such data. Hence, inference control is important.
In conclusion, we can identify two problems of such association database system:
• Direct access control: there is sensitive data inside the database which should be
protected from unauthorized accesses;
• Inference control: there are ways to deduce sensitive data from known data. Also,
the sensitive data should be protected from unauthorized inferences.
This thesis is dealing with databases based on personal associations owned (provided) by individuals with the problems described above.

1.4

Strategy of Solution

To resolve the two problems described above, we have the following strategies:
• Establish criteria for security and privacy classification of association;
• An association owner (donor) has the responsibility and right to define appropriate classification of his associations;
• For direct access control, we will modify the traditional mandatory access control
model to address our problem;
• For inference control, we utilize both logic reasoning and probabilistic reasoning
to detect unauthorized inference, and then take actions to eliminate it.

1.5

Thesis Organization

The organization of the thesis is as follows:
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• The second chapter is technical background, it provides background knowledge
needed for later chapters;
• The third chapter is definitions and concepts, association databases are defined
and assumptions and simplifications are given;
• The fourth chapter is solutions, where we propose our methods to solve the
problems;
• The fifth chapter is conclusion which summarizes our work;
• The sixth chapter is future work, where the future study areas are listed;
• Next appendices are provided to show some algorithms and examples;
• The last part of this thesis is references.

Chapter 2
Technical Background
This chapter is about the background knowledge of database security and probabilistic
reasoning. Because this part is the knowledge foundation from which we derive our own
solution for the personal association database, we will present them as an introduction
for later chapters.

2.1

Security of Database

First, we will introduce some concepts relevant to database security. A good reference
of this area is [13].
There are three aspects of database security, they are:
• Secrecy: preventing/detecting/deterring the improper disclosure of information;
• Integrity: preventing/detecting/deterring the improper modification of information;
• Availability: preventing/detecting/deterring improper denial of access to services
provided by the system.

2.1.1

Direct Access Control Models

Knowing the security needs of a database system, we need to develop a proper security
model for it, which is a high-level, software-independent, conceptual model, starting
from requirements specifications that describe the protecting needs of the system. In
database system, security models can be broadly classified in two categories:
7
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• Discretionary security model governs the access to the information on the basis
of the user’s identity and of rules specifying, for each user and each object in the
system, the types of access the user is allowed on the object;
• Mandatory security model governs the access of users to the information on the
basis of the classification of the object and subject of the database.
In our model, the direct access control mechanism is based on mandatory security
model. Here, we review mandatory security model in detail. Different models have
been proposed in this category, they aim at protecting secrecy (Bell-LaPadula model )
[6, 7, 8, 9], integrity (Biba model [11]) or both of them (Dion model [17]). And there
are models which integrate both mandatory and discretionary policies, such as The Sea
View model [15]. In this thesis we concentrate on protecting secrecy for association
databases, so we will introduce the Bell-LaPadula model here.
The model is based on the classification of the system elements. Classifications
are expressed by security levels. Each security level is defined by two components:
a classification and a set of categories. The classification contains four levels: Top
Secret (TS); Secret (S); Confidential (C); Unclassified (U). The set is fully ordered:
T S > S > C > U . The set of categories is a subset of a non-hierarchical set of
elements. The set of the security levels forms a lattice, which is partially ordered
according to the dominance (≥) relationship. A security level L1 = (C1 , S1 ) is higher
or equal to (dominates) level L2 = (C2 , S2 ) if and only if the following relationships
are valid:
• C1 ≥ C2
• S1 ⊆ S2
If both relationships are strictly verified, then L1 is higher (>) than L2 .
The system elements consist of subjects and objects. Subjects are active elements of
the system that can execute actions (processes acting on behalf of users); objects are
passive elements of the system that contain information (files, memory areas, programs
etc.). Each user is assigned a security level named clearance. It reflects the user’s
trustworthiness not to disclose sensitive information to individuals who do not hold
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the appropriate clearance. Process activated by a user will be assigned the security
level of that user. Each object is assigned a security level. It reflects the sensitivity of
the information stored therein.
The following access modes are considered executable by subjects on objects:
• Read-only: to read information contained in an object.
• Append: to append information to an object without seeing its contents.
• Execute: to execute an object (program).
• Read-write: to write into an object, this mode also allows the subject to see the
object’s contents.
Axioms are defined which must be satisfied in order for the system to be secure.
i. Simple security (ss) property
A subject may have read or write access to an object only if the clearance of the
subject dominates the security level of the object.
ii. Star (∗) property
An untrusted subject may have append access to an object if the security level of
the object dominates the security level of the subject. An untrusted subject may
have write access to an object only if the security level of the object is equal to the
current security level of the subject. An untrusted subject may have read access
to an object only if the security level of the object is dominated by the current
security level of the subject.
iii. Tranquility principle
No subject can modify the classification of an active object.
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iv. Discretionary security property (ds-property)
Every current access must be present in the access matrix 1 .
v. Non-accessibility of inactive objects
A subject cannot read the contents of an inactive object.
vi. Rewriting of inactive objects
A newly activated object is assigned an initial state independent of the previous
activations of the object.
The Bell-LaPadula model above aims at achieving secrecy by preventing the unauthorized release of information.

2.1.2

Inference Control

Inference addresses the problem of preventing authorized users of a database from
inferring unauthorized information [1].
The term inference channel is often used to describe the inference problem. Garvey
et al. identified three inference channels [20], they are:
• Deductive inference channel : the higher level data can be derived from lower
level data via first-order logic deduction;
• Abductive inference channel : a less restrictive channel comparing to the above,
the first-order logic deduction can assume certain low-level axioms;
• Probabilistic inference channel : occurs when the probability of an occurrence of
an unauthorized inference is higher than an acceptable limit.
When inference channels are detected by the database system, actions to eliminate
these channels will be taken to prevent unauthorized inferences.
Inference control is difficult because a variety of inference methods can be used by
humans to infer unknown information, as follows [19]:
1

The set of security rules of a system is represented as a matrix A called access matrix, whose rows
represent system subjects and columns represent system objects. An entry A[i, j] represents the type
of access allowed for subject si to object oj .
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• Inference by Deductive Reasoning;
• Inference by Inductive Reasoning;
• Inference by Analogical Reasoning;
• Inference by Heuristic Reasoning;
• Inference by Semantic Association;
• Inferred Existence;
• Statistical Inference.
Another reason for the difficulty of an inference problem is that the uncertainty of
the knowledge base for a human to perform inference is present. The knowledge base
may contain:
• Information inside the database;
• Information outside the database;
• Information derived from known knowledge.
In a word, inference control is a complex task in database systems.

2.2

Probabilistic Reasoning

In this section, we will introduce knowledge about probabilistic reasoning [31].
Reasoning with uncertain knowledge and beliefs has been well recognized as an
important research issue in Artificial Intelligence (AI) [18, 34]. Several methodologies
have been proposed, including certainty factors, fuzzy sets, the Dempster-Shafer theory
and probability theory. The probabilistic approach is now by far the most popular
among all these alternatives, mainly due to a knowledge representation framework
called Bayesian networks or belief networks [25, 29].
First we want to depict first-order logic, which is a general-purpose representation
language based on an ontological commitment to the existence of objects and relations

2.2. Probabilistic Reasoning

12

in the world. First-order logic is one of the most popular tools in AI. However, the
problem of first-order logic, is that agents 2 almost never have access to the whole truth
about their environment.
Under this situation, uncertainty arises for the incompleteness and incorrectness in
the agent’s understanding of the properties of the environment. In order to have rational decision in an uncertain environment, probability which summarizes uncertainty
will be utilized for decision-making. In the following paragraphs, some basic concepts
of probability theory are listed.
Probability theory assigns a numerical degree of belief between 0 and 1 to proposition sentences. The percepts that an agent has received to date is called evidence.
According to the evidence, probability can be classified into two branches:
• prior (or unconditional) probability, the probability before the evidence is obtained;
• posterior (or conditional) probability, the probability after the evidence is obtained.
Next we will introduce the basic probability notations.
• The unconditional probability that the proposition A is true: P (A);
• The conditional probability that the probability of A given that all we know is
B: P (A | B).
The proposition in the notation can also be extended to random variables. Each random
variable X has a domain of possible values. For each possible value of X, P (X = x)
is determined. The combination of P (X = x) for all the possible values of X is
the probability distribution of the random variable X. If we have multiple random
variables in our P notation, P (X1, X2, X3), we define the joint probability distribution,
which completely specifies an agent’s probability assignments of all propositions in the
domain.
Next, we will introduce the semantics of statements in probability theory. There
are three axioms which are in fact sufficient:
2

An AI concept, an agent is just something that perceives and acts.

2.2. Probabilistic Reasoning

13

• All probabilities are between 0 and 1, i.e. 0 ≤ P (A) ≤ 1;
• Necessarily true propositions have probability 1, and necessarily false propositions
have probability 0, i.e. P (T rue) = 1, P (F alse) = 0;
• The probability of a disjunction is given by P (A∨B) = P (A)+P (B)−P (A∧B).
From the above three axioms, we can derive all other properties of probabilities.
Before starting to introduce the concepts of probabilistic reasoning, one important
rule which is the basis of probabilistic reasoning will be presented. This is Bayes’ Rule.
P (B | A) =

P (A | B)P (B)
P (A)

This equation underlies all modern Artificial Intelligence systems for probabilistic
inference. The more general case of multi-valued variables can be written using the P
notation as follows:
P (Y | X) =

P (X | Y )P (Y )
P (X)

Bayes’ rule allows unknown probabilities to be computed from known, stable ones.
In general, if we have n pieces of evidence, combining them for computation may require
assessing a large number of conditional probabilities(up to n2 ); in many domains,
however, the application of Bayes’s rule can be simplified to a form that requires fewer
probabilities in order to produce a result. Conditional independence 3 brought about by
direct causal relationships in the domain allows Bayesian updating 4 to work effectively
even with these multiple pieces of evidence.
Next we will introduce the tool for representing knowledge under an uncertain
domain: belief networks. A belief network is a graph in which:
• Vertices represent random variables;
• Directed links represent direct influences between two vertices;
3

Given three random variables X, Y and Z, if we have following equations:
P (X | Y, Z) = P (X | Z)
P (Y | X, Z) = P (Y | Z)
we say that X and Y are independent given Z.
4
Bayesian updating is a process of incorporating multiple pieces of evidence. It incorporates evidence one piece at a time, modifying the previously held belief in the unknown variable.
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• Each vertex has a conditional probability table that quantifies the effects that
the parents have on the vertex. The parents of a vertex are all those vertices that
have arrows pointing to it.
• The graph has no directed cycles (hence it is a directed, acyclic graph, or DAG)
We can then compute the posterior probability distribution for a set of query variables, given exact values for some evidence variables. That is, the system computes
P (query | evidence).
The computation of P (query | evidence) depends on the structure of the belief
network. There are two kinds of structures of a belief network [31]:
• Singly connected network : in such a network, there is at most one undirected
path between any two vertices in the network, this data structure is also named
as poly−tree;
• Multiply connected network : in such a network, there is more than one path
between two vertices.
For singly connected networks, the calculation of P (query | evidence) can be solved
by a backward-chaining algorithm, see Appendix A.4. The complexity is linear in the
size of the network. For multiply connected networks, there are different ways to carry
out the calculation. The complexity is exponential in the worst case. The details of
some algorithms for probabilistic inference in a belief network are listed in Appendix
A.

2.3

Summary

In this chapter, the basic knowledge about database security and probabilistic reasoning
is reviewed.
• In database security domain, direct access control and inference control are briefly
depicted. Mandatory access control mechanism is introduced;
• In probabilistic reasoning domain, Bayes’s rule and belief network are briefly
presented.
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Mechanisms introduced here, such as mandatory access control and belief network,
will be used as tools to solve the privacy problems of association databases.

Chapter 3
Definitions and Concepts
A personal information database is a database inside which personal information is
stored. In this thesis, we limit our scope to a special personal information database:
an association database. In this chapter, we will define this association database and
describe its properties. Then, we will try to demonstrate the concept of an association
database from different perspectives, especially, we use a graph to represent knowledge
contained in an association database. At the end of this chapter, assumptions and
simplifications are given to specify our approach.

3.1

Definitions

In this section, definitions and features of association will be introduced.

3.1.1

Association

Association is the basic unit of an association database, that is, an association database
is a collection of associations. We assume these associations are owned by individuals;
an association has exactly one owner. In the following paragraphs, we start to introduce
the concept of association.
Definition 1:
A binary relation R from a set A to a set B is a subset of Cartesian product A × B,
denoted as: R ⊆ A × B.
When an ordered pair ha, bi is in a relation R, we write aRb, or ha, bi ∈ R. It means
that element a is related to element b in relation R.
16
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When A = B, we call a relation from A to B a (binary) relation on A.

Definition 2:
Given:
• a finite set of persons P;
• a finite set of binary relations R.
where R = {R1 , R2 , ..., Rn }, n ≥ 1 such that for each Ri ∈ R (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n), Ri ⊆
P × P.
An association is a triple hX, A, Bi, where X, A, B ∈ P and
• X is the association owner;
• A, B is the ordered pair hA, Bi ∈ Ri , Ri ∈ R.

i
Such an association is denoted by AR
Xo AB , it means person X owns an association

between person A and person B which is in binary relation Ri . Here the superscript of
the notation can be simplified to a number i, i.e. (AiXo AB ), it is a simplified notation
for Ri ; the number i is the index of the binary relation Ri in set R.
i
We use our notation AR
Xo AB to substitute the standard mathematical notation for

an ordered pair in a binary relation: ARi B, because in our association notation we
provide more information specifically about the ownership of association. But when
the ownership of an association is trivial 1 , we will use this standard mathematical
notation to denote an association.
Example 3:
A1Co AB is an association owned by person C and describes that person A and person
B are members of the soccer club SC, where we have R1 ∈ R and hA, Bi ∈ R1 . R1 is
a binary relation describes that person x and person y are members of the soccer club
SC, where hx, yi ∈ R1 .
1

Sometimes when we perform inference detection and control, the ownership of an association can
be ignored.
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By defining the concept of association, that personal information involving two
persons can be represented. However it cannot depict personal information which has
only one person involved. Here, we extend the concept of association so that we can
denote personal information which has one or two persons involved.
Definition 3:
A self association is a pair hX, Ai, where X, A ∈ P and
• X is the association owner;
• A is the ordered pair hA, Ai ∈ Ri , Ri ∈ R.

A self association is a special case of association where two persons of the ordered
i
pair are the same person. Such a self association is denoted by AR
Xo A , it means person

X owns an association of person A which is in binary relation Ri . Same as above, we
will use the simplified version AiXo A to denote such association.
Example 4:
A1Co A is a self association owned by C and describes that person A is a member of
the soccer club SC, where we have R1 ∈ R and hA, Bi ∈ R1 , R1 is a binary relation
describes that person x is a member of the soccer club SC, where hx, xi ∈ R1 .
An association is provided by an individual, the ownership is an important property
of an association. In this thesis, we have an assumption that every association’s owner
is one of the persons involved in the association, that is:
• For self association AiXo A , the owner X is A;
• For other association AiXo AB , the owner X is either A or B.
So, we change the notation to:
• The association between person A and person B and owned by person A is
denoted by AiAo B ;
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• The association between person A and person B and owned by person B is
denoted by AiABo ;
• The self association of person A owned by person A is denoted by AiA ;

3.1.2

Equivalent Association

Sometimes, different people are talking about the same story about the same person(s),
but how can we judge in what situation, two associations are equivalent? Before we
define the equivalent associations, we will first see some examples which demonstrate
scenarios of equivalent associations:
Example 5:
• Suppose we have two associations, A1Ao B and A1ABo . A1Ao B is provided by person
A and A1ABo is provided by person B. The two associations have the same
superscript, i.e. they describe the same ordered pair hA, Bi in the binary relation
R1 : AR1 B. Hence, these two associations are equivalent;
• Suppose we have two associations, A1Ao B and A1Bo A . They are mapping to different
ordered pairs in binary relation R1 : A1Ao B is mapping to hA, Bi; A1Bo A is mapping
to hB, Ai. We know that R1 is a binary relation that if an ordered pair hx, yi ∈ R1 ,
it means person x and person y are members of the soccer club SC. From that,
we can see actually that even if we swap the positions of x and y, the statement
expresses exactly the same relationship. That is, AR1 B is equivalent to BR1 A.
These two associations are equivalent;
• If two associations are self associations, we do not need to care about the order.
As long as the persons of the two self associations are the same person, and
the two self associations are mapping to the same binary relation, then they are
equivalent.

The examples above illustrate that the decision about whether the two associations
are equivalent is independent of the ownership of the associations. Intuitively, the
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equivalence relationship only relates to whether two associations are describing the
same thing, it does not matter what sources the associations come from. And in some
situations, we do not need to care about the order of an ordered pair in a binary
relation.
Definition 4:
A symmetric binary relation R is a binary relation on a set P, where it satisfies the
following property:
• Symmetric: xRy implies yRx for all x, y ∈ P.

Definition 5:
For any two associations AiAB and AjCD , they are equivalent, i.e. AiAB ≡ AjCD , if
and only if, when one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• A = C, B = D, and i = j;
• i = j, Ri is a symmetric binary relation, and A = C, B = D (or A = D, B = C);
• i = j, A = B, C = D (they are self associations, written as AiA and AjC ), and
A = C.

Definition 6:
For any two associations AiAB and AjCD , if i = j, then we say the two associations
are of the same type.
If two associations are equivalent, they must be of the same type; but not vice
versa. In this thesis, the concept of the associations of the same type will be frequently
used.
Example 6:
The following two associations are of the same type, although they are linguistically
different:
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• Person A owns association A4BAo says person B is person A’s private doctor;
• Person D owns association A4CDo says person C is person D’s private physician.

3.1.3

Sensitivity Index

Personal information and its security, privacy, sensitivity, confidentiality etc., cannot
be isolated. These inherent properties of association are vital to the success of the
association databases. We will discuss these properties here. These properties are
called security/privacy properties.
First, an overview of the security/privacy properties is given:
• The security/privacy properties contain multiple criteria, such as security, privacy, sensitivity, confidentiality etc.;
• We want the association owner to specify the security/privacy properties of the
data he owned, by doing this, the association owner executes the rights and
responsibilities to control his data;
• The association database system should enforce some rules which can provide
enough protection based on the security/privacy properties of association.
Here we use sensitivity index to describe an association’s security/privacy properties, we have multiple criteria for the sensitivity index of our association. By doing
this, we have more choices for association owners and deliberate control over our association. Now we have levels of sensitivity, privacy, personal security and confidentiality
that come into play. There are probably more criteria such as health privacy, financial
privacy etc.
Definition 7:
A sensitivity index is a 4-entry tuple hSensitivity, Privacy, Personal security, Confidentialityi,
where these four entries describe the security/privacy properties of an association:
• Sensitivity: the degree of the value (or importance) of an association, as well as
its vulnerability to accidental or deliberate threat;
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• Privacy: the rights an association owner has to self-determination as to the degree
to which the association owner is willing to share with others information about
himself that maybe compromised by unauthorized exchange of such information
among other individuals or organizations;
• Personal security: the degree of the importance for an association with respect
to the personal security of its owner;
• Confidentiality: the degree of protection that must be provided for an association
about individuals as well as organizations.

As above, we can see different criteria are focusing on different aspects. How to
take care of all these aspects is quite a big challenge. We will discuss it next chapter.
The sensitivity index of an association needs to be quantified. We call the quantified value sensitivity index level. A sensitivity index contains four criteria; hence a
sensitivity index level contains four criterion levels. For every criterion, there is a set
of values the criterion level can enter. In this thesis, we assume the value set for each
criterion is {0, 1}. It means that each criterion level can be either level 0 or level 1.
Definition 8:
A level function ` is a concatenation of four sub-functions:
• SENSITIVITY;
• PRIVACY;
• PERSONALSECURITY;
• CONFIDENTIALITY.
each of these four sub-functions associates each association in an association database
with its corresponding criterion level, e.g. SENSITIVITY(A) = A’s sensitivity level.
The level function ` associates each association2 in an association database with its
sensitivity index level.
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E.g., `(A5CD ) = (SENSITIVITY(A5CD ), PRIVACY(A5CD ),PERSONALSECURITY(A5CD ),
CONFIDENTIALITY(A5CD )) = (1, 0, 1, 0). In this case, we have:
• The sensitivity level of (A5CD ) is level 1;
• The privacy level of (A5CD ) is level 0;
• The personal security level of (A5CD ) is level 1;
• The confidentiality level of (A5CD ) is level 0.
We assume sensitivity index levels have been given as preferences by individuals
(association owners) so that the output of the level function can be decided. In this
thesis, we assume that there are only two levels for each criterion 3 , as the following
example shows:
Example 7:
A knows B

Sensitivity

Privacy

1

Y

Y

2
3

Personal security Confidentiality

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y

4
Table 3.1: Association Data with Sensitivity Index

3.2
3.2.1

Features of Associations
Conflicts between Associations

In an association database, associations are owned by individuals; also the level of
sensitivity indices are given by individuals. Different persons may have different views
2

In next chapter, the level function ` associates each association, user or involved person’s identity
with its (his) sensitivity index level. See section 4.1.1
3
At this stage, we only deal with binary value (YES or NO) for sensitivity index. Future studies
will involve finer granularity of the sensitivity index. ( Y in the table cell means the association is
sensitive/private/... Blank in the table cell means the association is not sensitive/private/...
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of the same thing. Therefore in an association database, conflicts exist. There are
three kinds of conflicts in an association database: linguistical conflict, data conflict
and sensitivity index conflict.
• Linguistical conflict
Linguistical conflict is the conflict relevant to the slight difference between the
linguistical expression of equivalent associations or associations of the same type.
In the example of associations of the same type (example 6) we point out that
there may be linguistical differences between the associations of the same type.
Although these associations are mapping to the same binary relation R ∈ R,
their linguistical expressions are different because different persons use different
words to describe the same relation.
Here, we assume there is a process which can identify the associations of the same
type and mapping them to the same binary relation, which is a meta description
of all these associations of the same type. The process resolves the linguistical
conflict at meta level.
• Data conflict
To describe the relationship between two persons, the two involved persons may
own different associations (they may tell different aspects or versions of their
relation), for example:

Example 8:
• Person A owns association: A1Ao B , A2Ao B ;
• Person B owns association: A3Bo A , A4ABo .

• Sensitivity index conflict
Sensitivity index conflict is the conflict relevant to the level of sensitivity indices
of equivalent associations. Different association owners may give different level
of sensitivity indices to equivalent associations .
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This conflict can be resolved by using our inference control methods. For details,
see section 4.2.6.

Example 9:
Looking at table 3.2 and table 3.3, the associations related to person A and
person B and their sensitivity index assessment.
Person B

...

Privacy

...

...

...

...

...

2

...

Y

...

...

...

...

...

Person A owns:

Table 3.2: Person A’s Assessment on Association with Person B

Person A

...

Privacy

...

...

...

...

...

2

...

...

...

Person B owns:

...
...

...

Table 3.3: Person B’s Assessment on Association with Person A
We can see, in the tables:
• Person A thinks his second association with person B is private(privacy);
• However person B doesn’t think his equivalent association with person A is
private(privacy).
Conflict arises in this situation.

3.2.2

The Property of Uncertainty

In an association database, every association describes some property or relationship
about person(s). Inherently, all associations are related to uncertainty. This is because:
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• An association obtained by its owner maybe incomplete or incorrect compared
to the reality;
• An association provided by its owner may not be the true story of the reality.
Hence, according to the reality, an association has two possible values:
• True, it is in accordance to the reality;
• False, it is opposite to the reality.
Another situation is that an association is not completely true or false. Under this
situation, assigning a numerical degree of belief to the association is a solution which
can represents this incompleteness.
In this thesis, we have an assumption that every association owner is a person who
is involved in the association. Based on this assumption, we assume the association
in an association database is a true description about the association owner, i.e. it’s
value is true.
We can see that the inference aspect of the association also has the property of
uncertainty, refer to section 4.2.2.

3.3

Association Database

In this section, we will describe our protection target, an association database in detail.
We will present an association database via different perspectives so that the concept
of an association database could be clearly expressed.

3.3.1

Logic Structure

First, we will discuss the logic structure of an association database, there are two
components:
• Meta-database, which contains:
• A binary relation set R and the mapping between associations and R;
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• Sensitivity indices of associations;
• Security/privacy control rules,
• Knowledge base for probabilistic reasoning etc.
• Association database, which contains:
• A person set P;
• Associations.

3.3.2

Conceptual Model

Here, we will present the conceptual model for an association database. There are four
entities in this model: person, association, sensitivity index4 , binary relation, as figure
3.1 shows.
• Person (Person set P), contains person ID as identification. One of the two
persons involved in the association is owner;
• Association, is the association class of the person entity, contains association
name as an attribute;
• Sensitivity index, linked with association, is the security/privacy assessment of
association. It contains four attributes. Each instance of association has one
sensitivity index instance;
• Binary relation (Binary relation set R), linked with association, contains relation
name as an attribute. One binary relation is mapping to many associations, while
one association is mapping to only one binary relation.
4

In the rest part of this thesis, we will use the term sensitivity index to denote sensitivity index
level.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Schema of Association Database in UML Notation

3.3.3

Graph Model

An association database can be described by a graph representation. In the following
paragraphs, we will introduce the graph model for an association database.
An association database is a directed, multiple graph G, which is a collection of
vertices V and edges E between vertices: G = (V, E), where:
• Each vertex is a person;
• Each edge is an association;
• There may be more than one edge between two vertices since they may denote different (or equivalent) associations between two people (e.g. work, social, church,
family etc.).
• The direction of an edge indicates the order of an ordered pair of an association, the edge always originates from the first element of the ordered pair, and
terminates at the last element of the ordered pair;
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• Edges which originate and terminate at the same vertex are self associations.
The following example is a sample association database which is represented as a
directed, multiple graph.
Example 10:

As described above, in this thesis we assume each sensitivity index criterion has a
binary value (YES or NO). For simplicity, we will use the number 1 to denote YES
and 0 to denote NO. The numbers in figure 3.2 such as (0100) denotes the sensitivity
index of the association.

Figure 3.2: Example of Graph Model for Association Database
From the figure 3.2, we can identify:
• Sensitivity index conflict between person A and person B (Two pairs: A1Ao B (0100),
A1ABo (0000) and A1Ao B (1100), A1ABo (0000), we can see they denote the same association owned by different persons with different sensitivity index);
• Data conflict between person B and person C (A1Bo C (1100) does not have its
counterpart A1BCo ; neither do A3Bo C and A2Co B , that means the information owners
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give different aspects about their relation).
• A5A is a self association.

3.4

Assumptions and Simplifications

• An owner of an association is one of the two persons involved;
• We assume that an owner provides true information about himself;
• All these associations may come from different sources, but we just ignore in this
thesis the process of transformation, cleaning, and integration;
• We ignore the process of identifying the associations of the same type, that is,
the process of mapping the associations to the binary relation set R;
• All sensitivity indices of associations are given by association owners;
• There would be more criteria for the sensitivity index, but we only consider 4 in
this thesis, they are: Sensitivity, Privacy, Personal Security and Confidentiality;
• There would be several levels inside each sensitivity index criterion; but we only
consider two levels in this thesis. For example, inside Sensitivity criterion, nonsensitivity and sensitivity are the two levels;
• A user of an association database may also be an association owner;
• We assume that belief networks and conditional probability tables are specified
by domain experts at this stage, although we may simplify this process in future
work;
• Our scope for inference control is inside the database, i.e. we do not consider
knowledge outside the database.
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Summary

In this chapter, we depict association databases in a formal way:
• From different perspectives, we illustrate the concepts and characteristics of association databases;
• We utilize directed multiple graphs to represent knowledge contained in association databases;
• We enumerate assumptions and simplifications to specify the scope of this thesis.
Based on these analyses of association databases, we will propose our solution next
chapter.

Chapter 4
Solution
In this chapter, we start to introduce our security and privacy model for association
databases. Threats to individual privacy arise mainly from authorized users of the
system, rather than from unauthorized users [37]. From the database point of view,
we focus on the access control of information (how to prevent unauthorized access to
information); and for authorized access, we assume that usage rules of the information
are given by legislation.
In the introduction chapter, we identified that in association databases there are
two problems for security/privacy control: direct access control and inference control:
• For the first problem, because every association in an association database has
been given a sensitivity index, we develop a variation of the classical mandatory
access control model to control the direct access;
• For the second problem, to control unauthorized indirect access (inference), we
utilize logic inference rules together with conditional probability theory to detect
the disclosure of higher level associations from the given lower level associations,
and then take actions to eliminate unauthorized inferences.

4.1

Direct Access Control

To perform access control, we need sensitivity indices of associations. In chapter 3 we
assume that all sensitivity indices for associations are given. If they are not available,
the system could assign them to associations automatically, i.e. the system sets default
sensitivity indices for associations and for those whose sensitivity indices are not given,
32
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these default sensitivity indices will take effect. The value of the default sensitivity
index for an association is the access class (see definition 9) of its owner, which is the
highest value of all the possible values this sensitivity index can take.
Associated with these sensitivity indices, an association database is an environment
which is classified to several levels. Therefore the suitable security model for this
environment is Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model.

4.1.1

Multi-dimensional Mandatory Access Control Model

We need to modify the classical MAC model to adapt to our problem, since we have
more than one security/sensitivity criterion for our associations. Multi-dimensional
Mandatory Access Control Model is proposed. The dimension here denotes security/sensitivity criterion. We assume that every criterion is an independent dimension
inside sensitivity index, hence our sensitivity index has four independent dimensions.
To set up the security rules, we must consider all these dimensions.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in MAC, all system elements should be classified. Thus
in association databases the following two elements should be classified:
• association;
• user.
And there is a special element in association databases: person’s identity which is
involved in an association (i.e. vertex in the graph representation). This element’s
access class is dominated by the association’s access class.
Hence, we extend the input of our level function ` (see definition 8 in section 3.1.3)
to an association, a user or an involved person’s identity. We have a new definition for
the output of the level function.
Definition 9:
An access class is the state of all sensitivity index dimensions, i.e. it is the output
of the level function `. An access class in this thesis is defined as a 4-entry tuple:
hS, P, P S, Ci where:
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• S denotes level of Sensitivity;
• P denotes level of Privacy;
• P S denotes level of Personal Security;
• C denotes level of Confidentiality.

An access class AC1 = hS1 , P1 , P S1 , C1 i dominates (≥) an access class AC2 =
hS2 , P2 , P S2 , C2 i if, and only if:
S1 ≥ S2 , P1 ≥ P2 , P S1 ≥ P S2 , C1 ≥ C2 holds.
If, for two access classes AC1 and AC2 , neither AC1 ≤ AC2 nor AC1 ≥ AC2 holds,
the two access classes are said to be incomparable.
Normally the comparison is between access classes of an association and a user. If
an association’s access class is incomparable with a user’s access class, the association
is invisible to the user; the same situation happens when the association’s access class
is higher than the user’s access class. In this thesis, if an association’s access class
is incomparable with a user’s access class, we will treat this association as a higher
level association to the user. In the following part of this thesis, we use higher level
association to denote both higher level association and incomparable association.
In an association database, we assume that only information owners are authorized
to modify (write) the associations they owned and the sensitivity indices of these
associations; for other users, the main access mode is READ. Therefore, we mainly
concern ourselves with READ access.
We will introduce our axioms for the direct access control model, they are:
• Write Property:
Only the association owner can write to his association.
This property ensures that only the association owner has rights to modify his
association and an association should not be modified by persons other than its
owner.
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• Read Property:
A user s can read an association o if and only if his access class dominates the
access class of the association. Formally, s can read o if and only if `(s) ≥ `(o).
No read up secrecy principle is enforced by this property.
• Access class of an association:
The access class of an association must be dominated by the access class of its
owner.
In order to be consistent with the read property above, the access class of an
association should be dominated by the access class of its owner.
• Access class of the identity of an involved person (vertex in the graph representation):
The access class of the identity of an involved person is the lowest one of all the
referring associations.
Because the identity of a person will be used as a reference in an association if the
person is involved in it, so the access class of the association must dominate the
access class of the reference (identity of the person). Otherwise, in an association,
we may not see the involved person(s) of the association.
• Access class modification principle:
Only the association owner is authorized to modify the state of the sensitivity
index (access class) of his association;
Only the security administrator is authorized to modify access class of a user.
Obviously, we assume in chapter 3 that the association owner has rights and responsibility to specify the sensitivity index of his association; after the sensitivity
index initialization, the owner could change it when it is necessary. However, a
user’s access class can not be modified by persons other than the security administrator.
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• Meta-database invisibility principle:
The meta-database part of the association database (including sensitivity index
and binary relation) is invisible to the users of the database; except, an association’s sensitivity index is visible to its owner.
The mapping between association and binary relation should also be hidden to
users, otherwise users can make an inference by using these mappings to discover
higher level associations.

4.2

Inference Detection and Control

Inference or the inference problem is that of users deducing (or inferring) higher level
information based upon lower, visible data [28].
Our idea for inference detection and control in an association database is to utilize
logic inference rules together with conditional probability theory to detect the disclosure
of a higher level association from the given lower level associations, and then take
actions to eliminate this unauthorized inference.
First let us look at some scenarios of inference in association databases.

4.2.1

Scenarios of Inference in Association Databases

To study the inference in association databases, we start from the most simple inference
scenarios. These inference scenarios will:
• help us to understand the characteristics of inference in association databases;
• help us to derive inference rules;
• show the importance of inference control.
The following paragraphs list these inference scenarios.
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Scenario 1:

Figure 4.1: Sample Association Database of Scenario 1
Suppose we have a simple association database, as figure 4.1 shows. In this sample
association database, we have two self associations: AiA and AjA , and `(AjA ) > `(AiA ).
For a user s, only a part of the database is visible according to his access class, as
figure 4.2 shows. Here, we suppose `(AjA ) > `(s) ≥ `(AiA ) 1 . So we use a dashed line
to denote AjA , which means that AjA is invisible to user s.

Figure 4.2: Sample Association Database of Scenario 1 for User s
Then, we say user s may infer AjA from known association AiA with a probability.
1

As said in section 4.1.1, if an association’s access class is incomparable with a user’s access class,
we will treat this association as a higher level association to the user. In this case, if we have:
• `(AjA ) is incomparable with `(s), and
• `(s) ≥ `(AiA ).
Then it is the same situation as shown in scenario 1.
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Example 11:
• AiA says person A’s family has a blood cancer history;
• AjA says person A has blood cancer.
As the example, from AiA , user s may infer AjA with a probability, which is a number
between 0 and 1 2 .

Scenario 2:

Figure 4.3: Sample Association Database of Scenario 2
Suppose we have a simple association database, as figure 4.3 shows. In this sample
association database, we have 4 associations: AhA , AjAB , AiBA and AkB , and
• `(AhA ) > `(AiBA );
• `(AjAB ) > `(AiBA );
• `(AkB ) > `(AiBA ).
For a user s, only a part of the database is visible according to his access class, as
figure 4.4 shows. Here, we suppose
• `(AhA ) > `(s);
• `(AjAB ) > `(s);
2

If the probability of inferring the higher level association is 1, we will treat the inference as a logic
inference.

4.2. Inference Detection and Control

• `(AkB ) > `(s);
• `(s) ≥ `(AiBA ).
So we use a dashed line to denote an invisible association.

Figure 4.4: Sample Association Database of Scenario 2 for User s
Then, we say user s may infer:
• AhA from known association AiBA with a probability;
• AjAB from known association AiBA with a probability;
• AkB from known association AiBA with a probability.
Here is an example,
Example 12:
• AiBA says person B supervises person A’s PhD course;
• AhA says person A is a professor;
• AkB says person B is a research student;
• AjAB says person A is person B’s teaching assistant.
As above, from AiBA , user s may infer other associations with probability.
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Scenario 3:

Figure 4.5: Sample Association Database of Scenario 3
Suppose we have a simple association database, as figure 4.5 shows. In this sample
association database, we have 3 associations: AkAB , AiCA and AjCB and
• `(AkAB ) > `(AiCA );
• `(AkAB ) > `(AjCB ).
For a user s, only a part of the database is visible according to his access class, as
figure 4.6 shows. Here, we suppose
• `(AkAB ) > `(s);
• `(s) ≥ `(AiCA );
• `(s) ≥ `(AjCB ).
So we use a dashed line to denote an invisible association.

4.2. Inference Detection and Control

Figure 4.6: Sample Association Database of Scenario 3 for User s
Then, we say user s may infer:
• AkAB from known association AiCA and AjCB with a probability.
Here is an example,
Example 13:
• AkAB says person A is person B’s coach;
• AiCA says person C is a player directed by person A;
• AjCB says person C and person B are teammates.
As above, from AiCA and AjCB , user s may infer AkAB with a probability.

Scenario 4:

Figure 4.7: Sample Association Database of Scenario 4
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Suppose we have a simple association database, as figure 4.7 shows. In this sample
association database, we have 3 associations: AiA , AiB and AjAB and
• `(AjAB ) > `(AiA );
• `(AjAB ) > `(AiB ).
For a user s, only a part of the database is visible according to his access class, as
figure 4.8 shows. Here, we suppose
• `(AjAB ) > `(s);
• `(s) ≥ `(AiA );
• `(s) ≥ `(AiB ).
So we use a dashed line to denote an invisible association.

Figure 4.8: Sample Association Database of Scenario 4 for User s
Then, we say user s may infer:
• AjAB from known association AiA and AiB .
Here is an example,
Example 14:
• AjAB says person A is person B’s teammates;
• AiA says person A is a player of SC soccer team;
• AiB says person B is a player of SC soccer team.
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As above, from AiA and AiB , user s may infer AjAB .

Scenario 5:

Figure 4.9: Sample Association Database of Scenario 5
Suppose we have a simple association database, as figure 4.9 shows. In this sample
association database, we have 3 associations: AjAB , AiCA and AiDB and
• `(AjAB ) > `(AiCA );
• `(AjAB ) > `(AiDB ).
For a user s, only a part of the database is visible according to his access class, as
figure 4.10 shows. Here, we suppose
• `(AjAB ) > `(s);
• `(s) ≥ `(AiCA );
• `(s) ≥ `(AiDB ).
So we use a dashed line to denote an invisible association.
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Figure 4.10: Sample Association Database of Scenario 5 for User s
Then, we say user s may infer:
• AjAB from known association AiCA and AiDB .
Here is an example,
Example 15:
• AjAB says person A and person B are both in the Australian parliament;
• AiCA says person C and person A are both in the Australian parliament;
• AiDB says person D and person B are both in the Australian parliament.
As above, from AiCA and AiDB , user s may infer AjAB .

After showing these inference scenarios, we have a summary which describes the
characteristics of inference control in an association database.

4.2.2

Characteristics of Inference Control in an Association
Database

The inference control in an association database has its own characteristics:
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• The control is on data level, not on schema level;
As the scenarios and examples shows, the inference in an association database
depends on the semantics of associations. This property increases the difficulty
of inference control. Compared to inference control on schema level, a larger
amount of information and variety of situations need to be processed.
• The control depends on probability, or on logic.
As the examples shown in scenario 1, 2 and 3, we can see that the results of those
inferences are not like the results derived by logic. This type of inference result
is not completely true (or false), but is true (or false) with uncertainty. Here, we
say, these inferences are under uncertainty domain. That is because:
• The information we have is incomplete or incorrect;
• The understanding of the information we have is incomplete or incorrect;
• The inference is imperfect. We base our inference on experiences and experts’ suggestions.
These reasons determine that this type of inference in an association database
is not logic reasoning; but is an estimate of the possible result. We call this
type of inference probabilistic inference. Probabilistic reasoning, a reasoning tool
under uncertainty domain which leads to rational decisions even when there is
not enough information available, will be utilized to control this type of inference.
Another type of inference is easier to understand. It is based on logic, we call it
logic inference. The result of this type of inference is completely true (or false),
as shown in scenario 4 and 5.
Here is another example:
Example 16:
• AiAB says person A is older than person B;
• AiBC says person B is older than person C;
From the above two associations and logic we can easily derive:
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• AiAC says person A is older than person C.

From the above analysis, we conclude that inference in an association database is:
• probabilistic inference;
• logic inference;
• a mixture of the above two.
Then, what is inference?
Definition 10:
Given:
• an association database G;
• a user s with an access class ACs .
The visible part for that user s is a sub-graph Gs , where Gs ⊆ G
For user s, an inference is his activity to construct additional edge e based on Gs .
If the inference process contains probabilistic inferences, e is added with a probability.
In the following paragraphs, we will start to discuss these two types of inferences
in detail. First, logic inference is depicted.

4.2.3

Logic Relations of Binary Relation

To discover the logic inference in association database, first we need to solve the following two questions:
• What binary relations can be used for logic inference?
• What relations between binary relations can be used for logic inference?
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Here we discover some logic relations of binary relation, which are the keys to
solve the above two questions. They can be used for logic inference. We have already
introduced one logic relation in section 3.1.2: symmetric binary relation, which has
been defined in Definition 4. In this section, other logic relations will be introduced.
Definition 11:
A transitive binary relation R where R ∈ R satisfies the following property:
• Transitive: if xRy and yRz, then xRz for all x, y, z ∈ P and x 6= y 6= z.

Example 17:
A binary relation R describes that x is taller than y, when hx, yi ∈ R. Obviously,
R is a transitive binary relation, because if x is taller than y and y is taller than z,
then x is taller than z with no uncertainty.

Definition 12:
A correlate binary relation R where R ∈ R satisfies the following property:
• If xRy and uRv, then xRu, xRv, yRu, yRv for all x, y, u, v ∈ P and x 6= u, y 6=
u, x 6= v, y 6= v.

An example of correlate binary relation can be found in example 15. In that example, the binary relation R describes that x and y are both in the Australian parliament,
when hx, yi ∈ R. R is a correlate binary relation.
Definition 13:
For two binary relations Ri and Rj where Ri , Rj ∈ R, if xRi y, then xRj y for all
x, y ∈ P. We say Ri implies Rj , denoted as Ri → Rj .
The imply relation satisfies the following properties:
• Reflexivity: Ri → Ri ;
• Transitivity: if Ri → Rj and Rj → Rk , then Ri → Rk .
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Example 18:
A binary relation Ri describes that x is a postgraduate student, when hx, xi ∈ Ri ; A
binary relation Rj describes that x is a student, when hx, xi ∈ Rj ; Obviously, Ri → Rj

Definition 14:
A decomposable binary relation R where R ∈ R satisfies the following property:
• If xRy then xRx, yRy for all x, y ∈ P and x 6= y.

Example 19:
A binary relation R describes that x and y are both in parliament, when hx, yi ∈
R. Obviously, R is a decomposable binary relation, because if x and y are both in
parliament then x is in parliament and y is in parliament.

Definition 15:
Suppose we have three binary relations Ri , Rj , Rk , where Ri , Rj , Rk ∈ R and i 6=
j 6= k:
• If xRi y, then xRj x, for all x, y ∈ P and x 6= y. We call Ri left-side imply Rj .
• If xRi y, then yRk y, for all x, y ∈ P and x 6= y. We call Ri right-side imply Rk .

Example 20:
A binary relation Ri describes that x is y’s teacher, when hx, yi ∈ Ri ; A binary
relation Rj describes that x is a student, when hx, xi ∈ Rj ; A binary relation Rk
describes that x is a teacher, when hx, xi ∈ Rj ; Obviously, Ri left-side imply Rj and
right-side imply Rk .
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Logic Inference Rules

After the definition of deterministic relations of binary relation, we can move forward
to the definition the logic inference rules, which can be used for inference control.
For Ri , Rj ∈ R and all x, y, z, u, v ∈ P, we have seven logic inference rules, they
are:
• Symmetric: if Ri is a symmetric binary relation, then xRi y → yRi x;
• Transitivity: if Ri is a transitive binary relation, then xRi y, yRi z → xRi z, where
x 6= y 6= z;
• Implication: if Ri implies Rj , then xRi y → xRj y;
• Correlation: if Ri is a correlate binary relation, then xRi y, uRi v → xRi u, where
x 6= u, y 6= u, x 6= v, y 6= v;
• Decomposition: if Ri is a decomposable binary relation, then xRi y → xRi x, yRi y,
where x 6= y;
• Left-side implication: if Ri left-side imply Rj , then xRi y → xRj x, where x 6= y;
• Right-side implication: if Ri right-side imply Rj , then xRi y → yRi y, where x 6= y.
To use these logic inference rules, we need to categorize our binary relation set and
record these deterministic relations of binary relation. We have seven categories:
• Symmetric binary relation: it records all symmetric binary relations;
• Transitive binary relation: it records all transitive binary relations;
• Correlate binary relation: it records all correlate binary relations;
• Decomposable binary relation: it records all decomposable binary relations;
• Implication relation: it records all implication relations between binary relations;
• Left-side implication relation: it records all left-side implication relations between
binary relations;
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• Right-side implication relation: it records all right-side implication relations between binary relations.
These categories are stored in the meta-database and are incorporated with logic
inference rules to make logic inference.
Here we review scenario 4 and 5 and use our logic inference rule to deduce the
higher level association.
• In scenario 4, example 14, we have Ri in correlate binary relation category and
Ri → Rj in implication relation category. There, the inference process is:
• Ri is a correlate binary relation, applying correlation rule: ARi A, BRi B →
ARi B;
• Ri → Rj , applying implication rule: ARi B → ARj B.
• In scenario 5, example 15, the binary relation Ri describes that x and y are both
in the Australian parliament, when hx, yi ∈ Ri , Ri is a correlate binary relation.
Then the inference process is:
• Ri is a correlate binary relation, applying correlation rule: CRi A, DRi B →
ARi B.
We find that after applying our logic inference rules to a visible graph we can derive
a new graph by adding all the inferred associations (edges) onto the visible graph.
Definition 16:
Given:
• an association database G;
• a user s with an access class ACs .
The visible part to user s is a graph Gs , where Gs ⊆ G.
After we apply our logic inference rules to Gs , and we add all the inferred edges
onto it, then we derive another graph G`s , where Gs ⊆ G`s .
We call G`s the logic graph of Gs .
We can start to introduce probabilistic inference.
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Probabilistic Inference

As said in inference characteristics, section 4.2.2, the result of probabilistic inference
is true (or false) with uncertainty. Here we will use probability (a number between 0
and 1) to denote the degree of this uncertainty. To explore the probabilistic inference
in an association database, we start with the following definitions:
Definition 17:
Given:
• an association database G.
An information context for a vertex (a person) A is the set of all edges (include
vertices) that directly or indirectly connect to A. It is denoted by C(A).
Vertex A is called the center person; any other vertex V ∈ C(A) is called relate
person.
An information context is a sub-graph of the association database, i.e. C(A) ⊆ G.
An information context has a concept level, which indicates the range of the information
context relative to the center person. We have a recursive definition for the level of an
information context.
Definition 18:
Given:
• an association database G.
For a vertex A,
• the information context at level 0:
C0 (A) = {A, AiA : AiA ∈ G};
• the information context at level 1:
C1 (A) = {X, f (X) : ∃ AiAX ∈ G or AjXA ∈ G };
• the information context at level n (n ≥ 2):
Cn (A) = {X, f (X) : ∃ Y ∈ C(n−1) (A) and AiXY ∈ G or AjY X ∈ G } .
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where f (X) is a function which returns all self associations of vertex X and all
associations between vertex X and vertex Y , where X ∈ Cm (A), Y ∈ C(m−1)→m (A)
3

and m ≥ 1.

Example 21:

Figure 4.11: Example of Information Context of Vertex A

Having the above level definition, we extend our information context notation to
denote a set of levels of an information context.
We use Ci→j (A) to denote the information context for person A between level i and
level j (including level i and level j), where i ≤ j.
Having these definitions, we can look at inference scenario 1, 2 and 3. For each
of these inference scenarios, we start with two information contexts of the two center
3
C(m−1)→m (A) denotes information context of A between level m − 1 and level m, i.e. information
context of both level m − 1 and level m.
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, and then the inference problem is described as deriving additional edges

between these two center persons.
• For scenario 1, the two information contexts are shown in figure 4.12:

Figure 4.12: Inference in Scenario 1

Here, in order to construct these two information contexts, we duplicate vertex
A and use an artificial association AA to assist the construction. The dashed line
in the figure may be derived with a probability.
We find that these two information contexts have the same information: vertex
A.
• For scenario 2, the two information contexts are shown in figure 4.13:

Figure 4.13: Inference in Scenario 2
4

We will use a dashed line rectangle to denote the region of an information context
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Here, we also duplicate the vertex B and use one artificial association AB to assist
the construction of these two information contexts. If we use another artificial
association AA , then the construction will be different. Only the first situation
is shown here. The dashed line in the figure is the inference result.
We find that these two information contexts have the same information: vertex
B.
• For scenario 3, the two information contexts are shown in figure 4.14:

Figure 4.14: Inference in Scenario 3

Here, we divide these two information contexts by duplicating the vertex C. The
dashed line in the figure is the inference result.
Again, we find that these two information contexts have the same information:
vertex C.
After this analysis of the three inference scenarios and their examples, we summarize
that:
• it is difficult to set up general probabilistic inference rules to decide the value of
the probability. This type of inference depends on empirical estimate;
• it is easy to find whether it is possible to deduce higher level associations between
two vertices (persons) through graph analysis. After we apply the logic rules on
the visible part of the graph, one necessary condition to deduce associations
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between two vertices is that the information contexts for the two vertices must
have the same information (i.e. they are overlapping).
Therefore, we derive our probabilistic inference rule.

Given:
• An association database G;
• A user s with an access class ACs .
The visible part to user s is Gs , where Gs ⊆ G;
The logic graph of Gs is G`s ;
In G`s , we have:
• information context for vertex A: C(A);
• information context for vertex B: C(B).
where C(A), C(B) ⊆ G`s
Then, if C(A) ∩ C(B) = ∅, it is impossible to deduce any association between
these two vertices.

Because the probability calculation of probabilistic inference is a complex task,
we can utilize this probabilistic inference rule to judge if we need to calculate the
probability. Although this rule does not resolve our problem directly, it simplifies our
task.
After introduction of this probabilistic inference rule, we present an algorithm which
tries to find out if there is identical information between two information contexts.
Suppose we want to infer an invisible association between person A and person B.
Then the two sub-graphs we need to operate on are:
• the information context for person A, C(A);
• the information context for person B, C(B).
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where C(A), C(B) ⊆ G`s .
Then the algorithm is:
START
IF((C(A) ∩ B 6= ∅)
mayInf er = true
ELSE
mayInf er = f alse
END
Algorithm 1
This algorithm is very simple, it only checks whether vertex B ∈ C(A). It uses a
boolean variable mayInf er to store the result of this algorithm:
• If mayInf er = true, then it is possible to infer an association between A and B;
• If mayInf er = f alse, then it is impossible to infer an association between A and
B.
Actually, we find that, the higher level of the information context, the weaker the
correlation is from this level of information context to the center person, that is, the
less information it provides for the center person.
So for the aim of simplicity, we make an assumption that if there is a part of
an information context whose level is higher than a predefined threshold c` then the
correlation is so weak that this part of information context can be ignored. Here we
develop another algorithm to find out if there is identical information in two information
contexts and the algorithm ignores part of information context whose level is higher
than c`.
Suppose we want to infer the invisible association between person A and person B.
Then the two sub-graphs we need to operate on is:
• the information context for person A, C(A), it’s max level is m;
• the information context for person B, C(B), it’s max level is n.
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where C(A), C(B) ⊆ G`s and n ≥ m.
The algorithm is:
START
mayInf er = f alse
FOR (i = 0; i ≤ n AND i ≤ c`; i + +)
{
IF(i ≤ m)
{
IF(C0→i (A) ∩ C0→i (B) 6= ∅)
{
mayInf er = true
BREAK
}
}
ELSE
{
IF(C0→m (A) ∩ C0→i (B) 6= ∅)
{
mayInf er = true
BREAK
}
}
}
END
Algorithm 2
This algorithm will start from the two center persons, expand the information
context level by level until one of the following three conditions is satisfied:
• find the same information;
• finish scanning all levels of the two information contexts;
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• finish scanning all levels of the two information contexts which are less than c`.
Same as in algorithm 1, it uses a boolean variable mayInf er to store the result of
this algorithm:
• If mayInf er = true, then it is possible to infer an association between A and B;
• If mayInf er = f alse, then it is impossible to infer an association between A and
B.
After we introduce logic inference and probabilistic inference in an association
database, in the next section, we will give the formal definition of unauthorized inference in an association database.

4.2.6

Unauthorized Inference in Association Databases

In this section, we formally define the inference problem in association databases.
Definition 19:
Given:
• an association database G;
• a user s with an access class ACs .
The visible part for that user s is a sub-graph Gs , where Gs ⊆ G
For user s, unauthorized inference is his activity to construct additional edge e from
Gs logically or with a high probability 5 , in which e ∈ G \ Gs .
From this definition, an inference is an unauthorized inference if and only if the
derived association is an existing association in the invisible part of the association
database, and the inference is logic or with a high probability.
Example 22:
In section 3.2.1, we have already mentioned the sensitivity index conflict. it is
about equivalent associations with different sensitivity indices. Consider the following
sensitivity index conflict scenario:
5

This probability will be compared with a predefined threshold p to decide if it is high or low.
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• A5Ao B ≡ A5ABo ;
• `(A5Ao B ) > `(A5ABo ).
Then from logic inference rule:
Implication rule (the property of reflexivity): xRi y → xRi y.
We derive: AR5 B → AR5 B.
If the user’s access class is equal to `(A5ABo ), then A5Ao B is invisible to him. But he
can infer A5Ao B from visible A5ABo through logic inference rule.
Therefore, this inference is an unauthorized inference, it must be handled by inference control methods.
We will start to introduce our idea about inference detection and control methods.

4.2.7

Inference Detection

Inference detection is the action which finds out all higher level associations derived by
unauthorized inferences.
For a particular access class of a user, after inference detection, all higher level
associations will be marked with two types of labels:
• disclosed: this association can be unauthorized inferred, OR
• safe: this association cannot be unauthorized inferred.
In the following paragraphs, we introduce our basic idea for inference detection.
Given:
• an association database G;
• a user s with an access class ACs .
The visible part for user s is a sub-graph Gs , where Gs ⊆ G
The following steps show the process of inference detection:
• Applying logic inference rules on Gs , derive logic graph G`s ;
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• If any logic inference is an unauthorized inference, then the derived higher
level association needs to be marked as a disclosed association.
• After this process, we call all higher level associations which have not been
marked as plain association.
• Applying the probabilistic inference rule on the logic graph G`s ,
• If there are one or more plain associations between two vertices, then apply
the probabilistic inference rule on these two vertices.
• If it is impossible to infer any higher level association between these two
vertices, then mark all plain associations between these two vertices as
safe association;
• If it is possible to infer a higher level association between these two
vertices, then mark all plain associations between these two vertices as
suspect association.
• If a suspect association exists, we need to use probabilistic reasoning to calculate
the probability of this suspect association being inferred. This probability is
called the inference probability. If this inference probability is higher than or
equal to a predefined threshold p, then this suspect association is marked as a
disclosed association, otherwise it is marked as a safe association.
For all those disclosed associations detected, actions need to be taken to protect
them from unauthorized inferences.
In order to show this inference detection process more clearly, we present an algorithm for it.
Given:
• An association database G;
• A user s with an access class ACs ;
• The visible part for user s is Gs , where Gs ⊆ G;
• The invisible part for user s is G \ Gs ;
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• All higher level associations form a set Eh , where Eh = {ei : ei ∈ G \ Gs and ei
is an edge};
• The set of all higher level associations which are marked as disclosed: Ed ;
• The set of all higher level associations which are marked as safe: Esa .
The algorithm is:
START
Find out the visible part Gs
Find out the logic graph G`s by using logic inference rules
FOR (e ∈ G`s \ Gs )

/∗ every derived edge e ∗/

IF (e ∈ Eh ) add e to Ed
FOR (e ∈ Eh \ Ed )

/∗ every e which is a plain association ∗/

{
Applying the probabilistic inference rule
IF (mayInf er = f alse) add e to Esa
}
FOR (e ∈ Eh \ Ed \ Esa )

/∗ every e which is a suspect association ∗/

{
Calculate inference probability
IF (inference probability ≥ p) add e to Ed
ELSE add e to Esa
}
END
Algorithm 3
It is a back-chaining method to detect unauthorized inferences. It starts from the
existing higher level associations, and for every higher level association, tries to find
out whether it can be unauthorized inferred.
In Algorithm 3, we need to calculate inference probability. We plan to utilize belief
networks to help with this calculation.
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For the purpose of inference probability calculation, we need to transform related
parts represented in our graph model to a belief network, which is used by probabilistic
reasoning. Then we perform the probabilistic reasoning on the derived belief network
to find out any probabilistic channel [20] which is forbidden.
First we compare the differences between the graph representation and belief networks. The differences are shown in the following table:
The graph representation

Belief networks

Person

Random Variable of

Vertex

Certain Domain(Event)
Edge

Association(Event)

Relation of direct influence
(Conditional Dependence)

Direction

Order of the ordered pair

Relation of cause

Properties of the graph

Directed

Directed, Acyclic

Table 4.1: Comparison between the Graph Representation and Belief Networks
Now we have the following questions:
• What information needs to be transformed into a belief network?
• How do we transform the graph into a belief network?
• How do we calculate the inference probability?
• Is there any way to simplify this process?
To perform the inference probability calculation, we need to solve the above questions. Suppose we have:
• an association database G;
• a user s with an access class ACs ;
and:
• the visible part for user s is Gs , where Gs ⊆ G;
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• the logic graph on Gs is G`s ;
• a suspect association e, where e ∈ G \ Gs and e ∈
/ G`s , it is an edge on vertex A
and vertex B.
Now we want to calculate the inference probability of the suspect association e.
For the first question, the information we need is:
• the information context C(A) on G`s 6 ;
• the information context C(B) on G`s ;
• the suspect association e.
For the second question, to transform the above information into a belief network,
we need to:
• treat all edges in C(A) and C(B) as random variables, and they serve as evidence
variables for this probability calculation;
• treat the suspect association as a random variable, it is a query variable for this
probability calculation;
• construct the belief network using the above random variables, let a domain
expert draw the direct influences (edges) among these random variables;
• let the domain expert specify the Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) of this
belief network.
After these steps, the belief network for inference probability calculation is set up.
It is a belief network with domain D = {e, all edges in C(A) and C(B)}.
For the third question, according to the structure of the belief network, there are
different ways to calculate this inference probability 7 . It is a conditional probability:
P (query variable = true | evidence variables = true). As we said above, the query
variable is the suspect association and the evidence variables are all edges in C(A) and
C(B).
6

For simplicity, we may ignore the information context whose level is higher than c`, then less data
needs to be processed.
7
As written in technical background part, chapter 2, and in appendix A
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For a singly connected network:
• There is a simple backward-chaining algorithm introduced in Russell and Norvig
[31], see Appendix A.4.
For a multiply connected network, we may use different methods for the calculation:
• Clustering methods;
• Cutset conditioning methods;
• Stochastic simulation methods.
For a detailed description of these methods, see Russell and Norvig [31]; for a
detailed description of probability inference algorithms, see Appendix A.
For the fourth question, the answer is yes. The idea to simplify this process is to
prestore some of these belief networks so that when information needed for calculation
matches (i.e. is a subset of) the domain of a belief network, the probability calculation
can be solved by that belief network 8 .
We have a meta description for associations: binary relation set. We can utilize
this binary relation set to make the prestored belief networks also at meta level. That
means, all random variables in a belief network is in the form of xRi y where x and y
are not particular persons, but person variables which can be any person in set P.
The construction of a belief network has two steps [31]:
• Topology specification, all direct conditional dependence relationships among the
random variables are specified;
• Conditional probability table specification, conditional probabilities for the vertices that participate in direct dependencies are specified.
And usually, the first step is much easier than the second step.
After we have this meta belief network set BN , for a particular inference probability
calculation problem, suppose:
8

That is, when information needed for calculation matches the domain of a belief network, we can
utilize the prestored belief network directly instead of transforming the information needed into a
belief network.

4.2. Inference Detection and Control

65

• There are BN size belief networks inside BN ;
• The information needed is Ineed = {e, all edges in C(A) and C(B)};
• Suppose we perform the first step of belief network construction on Ineed . After we
get the topology of Ineed , we can delete all irrelevant associations which have no
connection to the query variable. After this operation, we obtain a new domain
of the inference calculation problem: Irelevant , where Irelevant ⊆ Ineed ;
• For a belief network bni ∈ BN , its domain is Di ;
• We have a function MATCH which matches a probability calculation problem
domain to a belief network bni ∈ BN , it takes a problem domain and the meta
belief network set as input, and output the index of the prestored meta belief
network; if no match is found, it returns 0. If the problem domain matches the
pattern of a meta belief network bni , then this inference probability calculation
problem can be solved by using bni .
The MATCH function is:
function MATCH(I, BN ) returns the index of the prestored meta belief network
that matches the calculation problem or 0 if no match is found.
inputs: I, a calculation problem domain;
BN , the meta belief network set.
replace the particular persons with person variables in I, result in I 0
FOR (i = 1; i <= BN size; i + +)
IF (I 0 ⊆ Di )
return i
return 0
The MATCH function
Based on the above assumptions, we develop an algorithm to process an inference
probability calculation problem. The algorithm is:
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START
retrieve Ineed
index =MATCH(Ineed , BN )
IF (index) /∗ if there is a match found ∗/
calculate the inference probability using bnindex
ELSE /∗ if there is no match found ∗/
{
perform the first step of belief network construction, retrieve Irelevant
index =MATCH(Irelevant , BN )
IF (index) /∗ if there is a match found ∗/
calculate the inference probability using bnindex
ELSE /∗ if there is no match found ∗/
{
perform the second step of belief network construction, derive a belief network
calculate the inference probability using this belief network
replace the particular persons with person variables, derive bnBN size+1
add bnBN size+1 into BN , update BN size = BN size + 1
}
}
END
Algorithm 4
Therefore, we have a way to use prestored belief networks to solve the inference
probability calculation problem. These meta belief networks work as predefined rules
to regulate our database.

4.2.8

Inference Control

After the inference detection process, we need actions to protect the disclosed associations from being deduced from unauthorized inferences.
There are two methods to solve this problem:
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• Increase the access class(es) of lower level association(s);
• Decrease the access class of the user.
As we can see, both of the methods are trying to decrease the amount of information available to the user, therefore to make the unauthorized inference impossible.
Normally, the first method to control unauthorized inference is used.
In order to control unauthorized inference, we need to solve the following questions:
• What lower level associations need to be upgraded?
• Does the increasing of the access classes of lower level associations affect the
result of the inference detection?
For the first question, it depends on whether the unauthorized inference is a logic
inference or a probabilistic inference.
• If the unauthorized inference is a logic inference, we need to upgrade one of the
lower level association which is used by the logic inference rules to derive the
higher level association. After this upgrade, the higher level association should
not be deduced by logic inference rules, otherwise, we need to upgrade more lower
level associations;
• If the unauthorized inference is a probabilistic inference, the upgrade of the lower
level association needs to refer to the belief network which is used to calculate
the inference probability. We need to select one or more direct parent vertices
of the higher level association (query variable of the belief network) to upgrade
their access classes. After the upgrade, the higher level association’s inference
probability should be less than the threshold p.
For the second question, the answer is yes.
• This upgrade will not change any safe association to a disclosed association;
however it may change some disclosed associations to safe associations. This is
because increasing access classes of some associations will not increase the amount
of information available. It is impossible to give the user more information to
make any other inference;
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• The upgraded association needs to be assessed whether it is safe or disclosed. If
it is disclosed, it must be protected from unauthorized inference. This will call
the inference detection and control process again.
Our inference control system is a precautionary inference control system, that means
we will try to prevent the unauthorized inference in advance. We try to make the
inference control process for each existing user access class, so when a particular user
accesses the database, he will operate on the processed safe associations. The situations
when the inference control will take place are:
• First, when an association database is set up, and all the associations are loaded
into the database, the inference detection and control process should be done
once per user access class value (except the top access class (1111), because every
association inside an association database is visible to a user with the access class
(1111));
• Every time when new association is provided, the inference detection and control
must take place.
• For every user access class which is lower than the access class of the new
association, we need to check if the new association can be unauthorized
inferred;
• For the user access class which is equal to the access class of the new association, we need to check if the new association can be used for unauthorized
inference(s).
And if we find any unauthorized inference in the above processes, we need to take
actions to eliminate it.

4.3

Summary

In this chapter, we have presented our security and privacy model for association
databases. This model consists of two parts: direct access control and inference control.
We have developed a new variation of the classical Mandatory Access Control to achieve
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the goal of direct access control. After an analysis of the inference control characteristics
of association databases, we have proposed logic and probabilistic inference rules used
for inference control. Together with the probability calculation tool (belief networks),
a complete inference control solution is shown.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have introduced a database which contains personal information,
an association database. An association database stores representations of real world
associations between persons. The sensitivity indices are provided by the information
owners, which are attached to associations as security and privacy classification of them.
We develop a graph model to describe the association databases. Next we discussed
the security and privacy issues of association databases. We point out two security and
privacy problems: direct access control and inference control. To address these two
problems, we propose our security and privacy model for association databases.
• For direct access control, we utilize a new variation of Mandatory Access Control
Model. We define axioms which prevent unauthorized direct access;
• For inference control, we utilize both logic reasoning and probabilistic reasoning
to detect and control unauthorized inferences. We define the concept of unauthorized inference. With our logic inference rules, probabilistic inference rule and
inference probability calculation tool (belief networks), we propose a method for
unauthorized inference detection and control.
Advantages of the model are:
• graph representation of database knowledge;
• data owner has rights to classify the data;
• inference detection and control mechanisms which provide the system with better
protection.
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There are also disadvantages of this system which need to be addressed in the
future:
• complex inference control mechanism which makes the implementation hard;
• the need to store the experts knowledge to perform probabilistic reasoning.
Our security and privacy model is a general model for personal information databases.
It can be applied to personal information databases such as:
• Health informatics;
• Student information system;
• Census databases;
• Police and Military databases;
and so on.

Chapter 6
Future Work
Our work touches many areas including database security, information privacy and
artificial intelligence etc. The security and privacy model introduced in this thesis is a
first step which set up a framework to solve the security and privacy problems existing
in association databases. Also as discussed above, this model has disadvantages. More
work needs to be done in the future in order to improve and enrich this model.
Future work may focus on the following problems:
• Extend the model so that more criteria and finer granularity of sensitivity index
could be imported;
• Find more logic inference rules and improve the probabilistic inference rule;
• Apply different treatments according to different criteria;
• Find ways to improve the efficiency of inference control, especially in belief networks construction and inference probability calculation;
• Investigate semantics of associations to discover meta level relationships which
can simplify the probabilistic reasoning;
• Deliberate on the inference control process;
• To improve this security and privacy model, more techniques other than access
control should be imported, such as authentication, auditing etc.;
• Investigate implementation issues of this security and privacy model.
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Appendix A
Probabilistic Inference and Algorithms
We will introduce probabilistic inference and algorithms in this appendix. The probabilistic inference utilizing belief networks has been well described in Zhang and Poole
[40] and Russell and Norvig [31]. We cite some paragraphs from them to illustrate the
idea about probabilistic inference.

A.1

Belief Networks

We assume that a problem domain is characterized by a set of random variables. Beliefs are represented by a Belief Network (BN), an annotated Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG), where vertices represent random variables, and edges represent probabilistic
dependencies amongst the variables. We use the terms ‘vertex’ and ‘variable’ interchangeably. Associated with each vertex is a conditional probability of the variable
given its parents.
In addition to the explicitly represented conditional probabilities, a BN also implicitly represents conditional independence assertions. Let x1 , x2 , ..., xn be an enumeration
of all the vertices in a BN such that each vertex appears after its children, and let Πxi
be the set of parents of a vertex xi . The Belief network represents the following independence assertion:
Each variable xi is conditionally independent of the variables in {x1 , x2 , ..., xi−1 }
given values for its parents. The conditional independence assertions and the conditional probabilities together entail a joint probability over all the variables. By the
chain rule, we have:
P (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ) =

Qn

i=1

P (xi | x1 , x2 , ...xi−1 )
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Qn
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P (xi | Πxi )

where the second equation is true because of the conditional independence assertions. The conditional probabilities P (xi | Πxi ) are given in the specification of the
BN. Consequently, one can, in theory, do arbitrary probabilistic reasoning in a BN.

A.2

Probabilistic Inference

Probabilistic Inference refers to the process of computing the posterior probability
P (X | Y = Y0 ) of a set X of query variables after obtaining some observations Y = Y0 .
Here Y is a list of observed variables and is the corresponding list of observed values.
Usually, X consists of only one query variable.
In theory, P (X | Y = Y0 ) can be obtained from the marginal probability P (X, Y ),
which in turn can be computed from the joint probability P (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ) by summing
out variables outside X ∪Y one by one. In practice, this is not viable because summing
out a variable from a joint probability requires an exponential number of additions.
The key to more efficient inference lies in the concept of factorization. A factorization of a joint probability is a list of factors (functions) from which one can construct
the joint probability.
A factor is a function from a set of variables into a number. We say that the factor
contains a variable if the factor is a function of that variable; or say it is a factor of
the variables on which it depends. Suppose f1 and f2 are factors, where f1 is a factor
that contains variables x1 , ..., xi , y1 , ..., yj , we write this as f1 (x1 , ..., xi , y1 , ..., yj ) and f2
is a factor that contains variables y1 , ..., yj , z1 , ..., zk , where y1 , ..., yk are the variables
in common to f1 and f2 . The product of f1 and f2 is a factor that is a function of the
union of the variables, namely x1 , ..., xi , y1 , ..., yj , z1 , ..., zk , defined by:
(f1 ×f2 )(x1 , ..., xi , y1 , ..., yj , z1 , ..., zk ) = f1 (x1 , ..., xi , y1 , ..., yj )×f2 (y1 , ..., yj , z1 , ..., zk )
Let f (x1 , ..., xi ) be a function of variable x1 , ..., xi . Setting, say x1 in f (x1 , ..., xi ) to
a particular value α yields f (x1 = α, ..., xi ), which is a function of variables x2 , ..., xi .
If f (x1 , ..., xi ) is a factor, we can sum out a variable, say x1 , resulting in a factor of
variables x2 , ..., xi , defined
P

(

x1

f )(x2 , ...xi ) = f (x1 = α1 , ..., xi ) + ... + f (x1 = αm , ..., xi )
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where α1 , ..., αm are the possible values of variable x1 .
Because of equation (1), a BN can be viewed as representing a factorization of a
joint probability. For example, the Belief network in Figure A.1 factorizes the joint
probability P (a, b, c, e1 , e2 , e3 ) into the following list of factors:
P (a), P (b), P (c), P (e1 | a, b, c), P (e2 | a, b, c), P (e3 | e1 , e2 )
Multiplying those factors yields the joint probability.

Figure A.1: A Sample Belief Network
Suppose a joint probability P (z1 , ...zm ) is factorized into the multiplication of a
list of factors f1 , f2 , ... , fm . While obtaining P (z1 , ...zm ) by summing out z1 from
P (z1 , ...zm ) requires an exponential number of additions, obtaining a factorization of
P (z1 , ...zm ) can often be done with much less computation. Consider the following
procedure:
Procedure sum-out (F, z): Inputs: F, a list of factors; z, a variable. Output: A
list of factors.
1. Remove from the F all the factors, say f1 , ... , fk , that contain z,
2. Add the new factor

P Qk
z

i=1

fi to F and return .

Only variables that appear in the factors f1 , f2 , ... , fk participated in the computation of sum-out (F, z1 ), and those are often only a small portion of all the variables.
This is why inference in a BN can be tractable in many cases, even if the general
problem is NP-hard.
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The Variable Elimination Algorithm

Based on the discussions of the previous section, we present a simple algorithm for
computing P (X | Y = Y0 ). The algorithm is based on the intuitions underlying
D’Ambrosio’s Symbolic Probabilistic Inference (SPI) [27, 33], and first appeared in
Zhang and Poole [39]. It is essentially Dechter’s [14] bucket elimination algorithm for
belief assessment.
The algorithm is called Variable Elimination (VE) because it sums out variables
from a list of factors one by one. An ordering ρ by which variables outside X ∪ Y to
be summed out is required as an input. It is called an elimination ordering.
Procedure V E(F, X, Y, Y0 , ρ)
• Inputs:
• F: The list of conditional probabilities in a BN;
• X: A list of query variables;
• Y : A list of observed variables;
• Y0 : The corresponding list of observed values;
• ρ: An elimination ordering for variables outside .
• Output:
• P (X | Y = Y0 ).
1. Set the observed variables in all factors to their corresponding observed values.
2. WHILE ρ is not empty,
Remove the first variable z from ,
Call sum-out.
ENDWHILE
3. Set h = the multiplication of all the factors on F. / ∗ h is a function of variables
in X. ∗ /
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4. Return h(X)/

P

X

77

h(X). /∗ Renormalization ∗/

The complexity of VE can be measured by the number of numerical multiplications
and numerical summations it performs. An optimal elimination ordering is one that
results in the least complexity. The problem of finding an optimal elimination ordering
is NP-complete [5]. Commonly used heuristics include minimum deficiency search
[10] and maximum cardinality search [36]. Kjærulff [30] has empirically shown that
minimum deficiency search is the best existing heuristic. We use minimum deficiency
search in our experiments because we also found it to be better than the maximum
cardinality search.

A.4

An Algorithm Works on Singly Connected (Polytree) Networks

The details of this algorithm can be found in Russell and Norvig [31].
In such a singly connected network, there is at most one undirected path between
any two vertices in the network.
A generic singly connected network can be described as follows:
Vertex X has:
• parent U = U1 ...Um ;
• children Y = Y1 ...Yn ;
• parents of Yi other than X is Zi , and zi is an assignment of values to the parents.
For each child and parent we can draw a box that contains all the vertices’ descendants and ancestors (except for X). The singly connected property means that
all the boxes are disjoint and have no links connecting them. We assuming that X is
the query variable, and that there is some set of evidence variables E. The aim is to
compute P (X | E).
We can divide the total evidence into two pieces:
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+
• EX
is the causal support for X, the evidence variables above X that are con-

nected to X through its parents;
−
• EX
is the evidential support for X, the evidence variables below X that are

connected to X through its children.
Sometimes we will need to exclude certain paths when considering evidence connected to a certain variable. For example, we will use EUi \X to refer to all the evidence
connected to vertex Ui except via the path from X.
Now we are ready to compute P (X | E). The general strategy is roughly the
following:
+
• Express P (X | E) in terms of the contributions of EX
and Ex− ;
+
by computing its effect on the parents of X,
• Compute the contribution of EX

and then passing that effect on to X. Notice that computing the effect on each
parent of X is a recursive instance of the problem of computing the effect on X;
−
by computing its effect on the children of X,
• Compute the contribution of EX

and then passing that effect on to X. Notice that computing the effect on each
child of X is a recursive instance of the problem of computing the effect on X.
Next we can present a backward-chaining algorithm to calculate P (X | E) in a
polytree.
The algorithm is:
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function BELIEF-NET-ASK(X) returns a probability distribution over the values of X
inputs: X, a random variable
SUPPORT-EXCEPT(X, null)
function SUPPORT-EXCEPT(X, V) returns P (X | EX\V )
if EVIDENCE?(X) then return observed point distribution for X
else
−
calculate P (EX\V
| X) = EV IDEN CE − EXCEP T (X, V )

U ← PARENTS[X]
if U is empty
−
then return αP (EX\V
| X)P (X)

else
for each Ui in U
calculate and store P (Ui | EUi \X ) =SUPPORT-EXCEPT(Ui , X)
−
return αP (EX\V
| X)

P

u

P (X | u)

Q

i

P (Ui | Eui \X )

−
function SUPPORT-EXCEPT(X, V) returns P (EX\V
| X)

Y ← CHILDREN[X] −V
if Y is empty
then return a uniform distribution
else
for each Yi in Y do
calculate P (EY−i | yi ) =EVIDENCE-EXCEPT(Yi , null)
Zi ← PARENTS[Yi ] −X
for each Zij in Zi
calculate P (Zij | EZi j\Y i ) =SUPPORT-EXCEPT(Zij , Yi )
return β

Q P
i

yi

P (EY−i | yi )

P

Zi

P (yi | X, zi )

Q

j

P (zij | EZij \Yi )

Algorithm 5
To simplify the presentation, we have assumed that the network is fixed and already
primed with evidence, and that evidence variables satisfy the predicate EVIDENCE?.
The probabilities P (X | U ), where U denotes the parents of X, are available from the
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conditional probability table for X. Calculating the expressions α... and β... is done
by normalization.

A.5

Inference in Multiply Connected Belief Networks

In the above section, we have introduced an algorithm works on singly connected
networks; here we briefly introduce some basic classes of algorithms for evaluating
multiply connected networks.
As described in Russell and Norvig [31], multiply connected graph is one in which
two vertices are connected by more than one path. it is a general topology of belief
networks. The three basic classes of algorithms are listed:
• Clustering methods transform the network into a probabilistically equivalent
(but topologically different) polytree by merging offending vertices;
• Conditioning methods do the transformation by instantiating variables to definite values, and then evaluating a polytree for each possible instantiation;
• Stochastic simulation methods use the network to generate a large number of
concrete models of the domain that are consistent with the network distribution.
They give an approximation of the exact evaluation.
Details of these methods can be found in Russell and Norvig [31].

A.6

Summary

In appendix A, we review the methods and algorithms used for probabilistic inference,
which, in our security and privacy model, is utilized as a tool for probability calculation.

Appendix B
An Example for the Access Control in
Association Databases
In this appendix, we use an example to depict our methodologies for the access control
of association databases. This example starts from the database setup phase, ends
with the inference control phase. By describing this complete process, it shows that
our security and privacy model works well to protect associations from unauthorized
accesses.

B.1

Database Setup

First, we collect data for the setup of an association database. The data we collected
are associations between persons, and the attached sensitivity indices specified by association owners.
Then we extract the meta-description from these associations. This process identifies the associations of the same type, ends with a person set P and a binary relation
set R and the mapping from associations to R.
At this point, we can draw the graph to represent this association database, as
figure B.1 shows:
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Figure B.1: Sample Association Database
To perform logic inference on the database, we need to record the logic relations
among these binary relations in predefined categories:
• Symmetric binary relation category is { 4 }, means R4 is a symmetric binary
relation;
• Transitive binary relation category is { 3 }, means R3 is a transitive binary
relation;
• Correlate binary relation category is { }, means no correlate binary relation in
R;
• Decomposable binary relation category is { }, means no decomposable binary
relation in R;
• Implication relation category is { h6, 8i }, means R6 imply R8 ;
• Left-side implication relation category is { h9, 5i }, means R9 left-side imply R5 ;
• Right-side implication relation category is { }, means no right-side implication
relation has been found.
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At last we define:
• The inference probability threshold is: p 1 ;
• The information context threshold is: c` 2 .

B.2
B.2.1

Access Control
Inference Detection

For a user s with access class ACs = (1100), the following associations are invisible to
s, as the blue lines shows in figure B.2:

Figure B.2: Higher Level Associations for User s
So the visible graph for s: Gs , is shown in figure B.3:
1

p denotes the acceptable level where if the inference probability ≥ p, then this inference is an
unauthorized inference.
2
c` denotes the level of the information context where all information contexts of level > c` can be
ignored.
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Figure B.3: The Visible Graph Gs for s
Then we start the logic inference process, from our predefined categories we have:
• A9AB left-side imply A5A ;
• A6CB imply A8CB .
A5A and A8CB are associations we derive from logic inference. The logic graph G`s is
shown in figure B.4:
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Figure B.4: The Logic Graph G`s for s
From figure B.4, we can see that the pink edges are the results of logic inferences.
There are two logic inferences and one of them is an unauthorized inference, because
A5A ∈ G \ Gs . So A5A is marked as disclosed association. All other higher level associations are marked as plain associations. So we have:
• Disclosed association: {A5A };
• Plain association: {A9AE , A4DE , A7DC , A2BC }.
Then we apply probabilistic inference rules on the logic graph G`s , this is because
we want to use associations found by logic inference to assist probabilistic reasoning.
But associations marked as disclosed association in the above step should not be used
for probabilistic reasoning, because it should not be visible to user s.
Vertices pairs need to check are: { hA, Ei, hD, Ei, hD, Ci, hB, Ci }, because there
are plain associations on these pairs.
We apply probabilistic inference rule on these pairs:
• C(A) ∩ C(E) 6= ∅, means it is possible to infer higher level associations between
this pair;

B.2. Access Control

86

• C(D)∩C(E) = ∅, means it is impossible to infer higher level associations between
this pair;
• C(D)∩C(C) = ∅, means it is impossible to infer higher level associations between
this pair;
• C(B) ∩ C(C) 6= ∅, means it is possible to infer higher level associations between
this pair.
Then we divide higher level associations into three categories:
• Disclosed association: {A5A };
• Safe association: {A4DE , A7DC };
• Suspect association: {A9AE , A2BC }.
For suspect association, we need to utilize a probabilistic reasoning tool (belief network) to calculate the inference probability, then decide whether the suspect association
is a disclosed association or a safe association.
Suppose now the prestored belief network set BN = ∅.
The first suspect association is A9AE , the information needed for inference probability calculation, Ineed is:
• C(A) on G`s ;
• C(E) on G`s ;
• A9AE .
Because BN = ∅, so the match function MATCH(Ineed , BN ) will return 0.
Perform the first step of belief network construction 3 , after this first step, the
topology of the belief network is shown in figure B.5:
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Figure B.5: Topology of the Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability of
A9AE
As figure B.5 shows, A8AB , A3CB , A6CB and A8CB are irrelevant associations to suspect
association A9AE . And Irelevant = {A1AB , A9AB , A1AE , A9AE }.
Still, because BN = ∅, so the match function MATCH(Irelevant , BN ) will return 0.
Perform the second step of belief network construction, after this step, we get
a complete belief work which can be used for probability calculation, as figure B.6
shows. The inference probability here is P (A9AE = true | A1AB = true, A9AB = true,
A1BE = true ). So when the domain expert specifies the conditional probability tables,
this inference probability is actually a lookup on the conditional probability table
attached on A9AE , where A1AB , A9AB , A1BE and A9AE all equal to true.
3

It is assumed a domain expert will construct this belief network, this includes two steps:
• Draw direct influence relationships between associations;
• Specify the conditional probability tables.
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Figure B.6: The Complete Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability of
A9AE
Next we replace the particular persons {A, B, E} with person variables {x, y, z},
then we have a meta belief network bn1 with domain {xR1 y, xR9 y, yR1 z, xR9 z}. Then
we add bn1 into BN for future use.
The second suspect association is A2BC , the information needed for inference probability calculation, Ineed is::
• C(B) on G`s ;
• C(C) on G`s ;
• A2BC .
Because BN = {bn1 }, so the match function MATCH(Ineed , BN ) will return 0.
Perform the first step of belief network construction, after this step, the topology
of the belief network is shown in figure B.7:
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Figure B.7: Topology of the Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability of
A2BC
As figure B.7 shows, A1AB , A8AB , A9AB and A1BE are irrelevant associations to suspect
association A2BC . And Irelevant = {A3CB , A6CB , A8CB , A2BC }.
Still, because BN = {bn1 }, so the match function MATCH(Irelevant , BN ) will return
0.
Perform the second step of belief network construction, after this step, we get a
complete belief work which can be used for probability calculation, as figure B.8 shows.
The inference probability here is P (A2BC = true | A3CB = true, A8CB = true ) 4 .
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Figure B.8: The Complete Belief Network to Calculate the Inference Probability of
A2BC
Then we replace the particular persons {B, C} with person variables {x, y}, then
we have a meta belief network bn2 with domain {xR3 y, xR6 y, xR8 y, yR2 x}. And we
add bn2 into BN for future use. Now BN = {bn1 , bn2 }.
Suppose the calculation has the following results:
• P (A9AE = true | A1AB = true, A9AB = true, A1BE = true ) ≥ p, then A9AE will be
marked as a disclosed association;
• P (A2BC = true | A3CB = true, A8CB = true ) < p, then A2BC will be marked as a
safe association.
We have divided the higher level associations into two categories:
• Disclosed association: { A5A , A9AE };
• Safe association: { A4DE , A7DC , A2BC }.
The inference detection process is finished.
4

Utilize conditional independence, we have P (A2BC = true | A3CB = true, A8CB = true ) =
P (A2BC = true | A3CB = true, A6CB , A8CB = true )
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Inference Control

This inference control process aims at eliminating unauthorized inferences. From the
inference detection step, we have found two disclosed associations: A5A and A9AE .
For A5A , it is unauthorized inferred by logic inference: A9AB left-side imply A5A . So
we need to upgrade the lower level association A9AB to eliminate this unauthorized
inference. Now we upgrade the access class of A9AB to (1110), this is the minimum
upgrade which will not sacrifice the security of the predefined sensitivity index of A9AB :
(1100). Now A9AB is invisible to s, it is impossible for s to derive A5A by using the
left-side implication rule.
But still, we need to detect whether the upgraded association A9AB can be unauthorized inferred. It is another inference detection process, we treat A9AB as the higher
level association which needs protection. We ignore this process here, and assume A9AB
is a safe association after detection.
The inference control to make A5A safe from unauthorized inference is finished.
For A9AE , it is unauthorized inferred by probabilistic inference. It has three causal
supports: A1AB , A9AB and A1BE . We need to upgrade one or more of them to eliminate
this unauthorized inference. In the above inference control step, we have already upgraded A9AB ’s access class. We can recalculate the inference probability where we do
not know A9AB ’s status. It is P (A9AE = true | A1AB = true, A1BE = true ) 5 . Suppose
after calculation, P (A9AE = true | A1AB = true, A1BE = true ) < p. So we can mark
A9AE as a safe association. Also from the above inference control step, we know A9AB is
a safe association after upgrade, so we don’t need to perform further inference detection
here.
Here after we upgrade the lower level association A9AB , we eliminate two unauthorized inferences existing in the association database. The database is protected from
unauthorized access by user s.
5

P (A9AE = true | A1AB = true, A1BE = true ) =

A9AB ), where A9AB maybe equal to true or f alse.

P

A9AB

P (A9AE = true | A1AB = true, A1BE = true,
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Summary

In this appendix, a supporting example is shown. From this example, we demonstrate
how the access control mechanisms protect association databases from unauthorized
accesses.
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